Email Security Basics: SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Plain English
SPF, DKIM and DMARC explained in plain English: what each record does, how to roll out DMARC without breaking email, and the mistakes we see most.
Your controller forwards you an email that looks exactly like it came from your CEO, asking her to push a vendor payment through before end of day. The display name is right. The signature is right. The only thing off is a gut feeling. Or maybe it goes the other way: your sales team's quotes have quietly started landing in customers' spam folders, and nobody can tell you why. Both problems usually trace back to the same three DNS records, and that's why I want to get SPF, DKIM and DMARC explained in plain English for the people who actually have to deal with them.
I'm a network engineer, and I've spent a lot of my 15 years in IT looking at DNS zones that nobody has touched since the website was built. Email authentication is one of those things that sounds like a deep technical project. It isn't. For most small businesses it's an afternoon of careful setup, followed by a few weeks of watching reports.
This guide walks through what each record does, how they work together, how to roll out DMARC without breaking your own email, and the mistakes my partner Mukesh and I see most often when we review a new customer's domain.
In this guide
- Why email authentication matters now
- SPF: the list of who is allowed to send for you
- DKIM: a tamper-proof signature on every message
- DMARC: the policy that ties SPF and DKIM together
- How to roll out SPF, DKIM and DMARC without breaking email
- Common mistakes we find on small business domains
- Frequently asked questions
Why email authentication matters now
Email was designed in an era when everyone on the network trusted everyone else. Out of the box, nothing stops a stranger from putting your domain in the "From" line of a message. SPF, DKIM and DMARC are the add-ons that let receiving mail servers check whether a message claiming to be from you really is.
There are two practical reasons this has moved up the priority list for small businesses.
The big mailbox providers now expect it
In February 2024, Google and Yahoo began requiring bulk senders (Google's threshold is roughly 5,000 messages a day to Gmail addresses) to have SPF, DKIM and a DMARC record in place. Microsoft announced similar requirements for high-volume senders to Outlook.com consumer addresses starting in May 2025. Google has also said all senders should at least have SPF or DKIM set up.
Most small manufacturers don't send 5,000 emails a day. But your marketing platform, your ERP's invoice emails and your quoting tool all send as you, and mailbox providers increasingly treat unauthenticated mail from any sender as suspicious. Missing records are a common reason legitimate mail lands in spam.
Spoofing and invoice fraud are real business risks
Business email compromise is one of the most expensive types of cybercrime the FBI tracks, year after year. A lot of those scams rely on look-alike or spoofed sender addresses. DMARC can't stop every one of them (more on that later), but it does stop criminals from sending mail that uses your exact domain to your customers and suppliers.
It also tends to come up in cyber insurance applications. If you're filling one out, our guide on how to answer your cyber insurance security questionnaire covers the email security questions in more detail.
SPF: the list of who is allowed to send for you
SPF (Sender Policy Framework) is a single TXT record in your domain's DNS. It lists the servers and services that are allowed to send email using your domain. When a receiving server gets a message, it checks the sending server's IP address against that list.
A typical SPF record for a company on Microsoft 365 that also uses a marketing tool looks something like this:
v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:servers.mcsv.net -all
How to read it
- v=spf1 says "this is an SPF record."
- include: entries pull in the sending servers of a service you use, like Microsoft 365, Google Workspace or a newsletter platform.
- -all at the end means "anything not on this list should fail." ~all (a "softfail") means "anything not on this list is suspicious." Many organizations start with ~all and tighten later.
SPF's limits
SPF has a hard limit of 10 DNS lookups. Every include: counts, and some includes contain more includes. Go over 10 and the whole record can fail, which is one of the most common problems we see.
SPF also checks the hidden "envelope" sender address, not the "From" address your users see. On its own, it doesn't stop someone from spoofing your visible From line. That's the gap DMARC closes.
DKIM: a tamper-proof signature on every message
DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds a digital signature to each outgoing email. Your mail service signs messages with a private key it keeps secret. You publish the matching public key in DNS. The receiving server uses that public key to confirm two things: the message really came from a system you authorized, and it wasn't altered in transit.
Setting it up
DKIM is usually turned on inside each sending service rather than written by hand.
- In Microsoft 365, you enable DKIM signing for your domain in the Defender portal and publish the two CNAME records it gives you (they use "selector1" and "selector2").
- In Google Workspace, you generate a DKIM key in the Admin console, add the TXT record it shows you, then click to start signing.
- For every third-party sender (marketing, CRM, invoicing, help desk), look for a "domain authentication" or "verify your sending domain" page. It will give you DKIM records to add.
Use 2048-bit keys where the service offers them. Older 1024-bit keys still work but are weaker.
Why DKIM matters more than people think
DKIM survives email forwarding much better than SPF does. When a customer forwards your message or a mailing list relays it, SPF often breaks because the sending server changes. A valid DKIM signature usually stays intact, so it's often what keeps your mail passing DMARC.
DMARC: the policy that ties SPF and DKIM together
DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance) is another TXT record, published at _dmarc.yourdomain.com. It does three jobs.
- Alignment. DMARC checks that the domain which passed SPF or DKIM matches the domain in the visible From address. This is what actually stops exact-domain spoofing.
- Policy. It tells receiving servers what to do with mail that fails: nothing, send it to spam, or reject it.
- Reporting. It asks receivers to send you daily reports showing who is sending email using your domain and whether it passed.
The three policy levels
- p=none: monitor only. Failing mail is delivered as normal, but you get reports. This is where everyone should start.
- p=quarantine: failing mail goes to spam or junk.
- p=reject: failing mail is refused outright. This is the goal for most businesses.
A starter record looks like this:
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@yourdomain.com
The rua address is where the aggregate reports go. They arrive as XML files that are painful to read by hand, so most people send them to a DMARC reporting service (several have free tiers for small domains) that turns them into a readable dashboard.
How to roll out SPF, DKIM and DMARC without breaking email
The most common fear I hear is "if we turn on DMARC, our invoices will stop going out." That only happens when people skip straight to p=reject. Here's the order we follow.
Step 1: Inventory everything that sends as you
Before touching DNS, make a list. Walk through each department and ask what systems send email with your domain in the From line. A typical list for a small manufacturer includes:
- Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace
- ERP or accounting system (invoices, statements, purchase orders)
- CRM and marketing tools
- Website contact forms
- Help desk or ticketing system
- Scanners, copiers and plant-floor systems that send alerts
- HR, payroll and e-signature platforms
The copiers and alerting systems are the ones people forget. They often relay through an old SMTP setup that nobody documented.
Step 2: Fix SPF and turn on DKIM everywhere
Build one SPF record that covers every legitimate sender and stays under 10 lookups. Remember you can only have one SPF record per domain; two records means both can fail. Then turn on DKIM in Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace and in every third-party service that supports it.
Step 3: Publish DMARC at p=none and read the reports
Publish a p=none record with a reporting address. Give it at least two to four weeks so you capture monthly jobs like statements and payroll. The reports will show you senders you forgot, plus anyone spoofing you.
Step 4: Tighten in stages
Once your legitimate senders are consistently passing, move to p=quarantine. Some teams use the pct= tag to apply the policy to a portion of failing mail first (for example pct=25), then raise it. After a few clean weeks at quarantine, move to p=reject.
Step 5: Protect domains that don't send email
If you own extra domains (old company names, typo domains, product sites) that never send mail, lock them down completely. Publish an SPF record of v=spf1 -all and a DMARC record with p=reject. Criminals like to borrow parked domains because nobody is watching them.
Step 6: Keep watching
DMARC isn't set-and-forget. Every time someone signs up for a new SaaS tool that sends email for you, it needs to be added. A quick monthly look at your DMARC reports catches problems before customers notice.
Common mistakes we find on small business domains
When Mukesh and I review a new customer's email setup, the same handful of issues come up again and again.
- Two SPF records. Often one left over from an old web host and one added for Microsoft 365. Merge them into one.
- Too many SPF lookups. Years of "just add another include" pushes the record past 10. Remove services you no longer use.
- DKIM never enabled in Microsoft 365. Mail still flows, so nobody notices it's off.
- DMARC stuck at p=none for years. Monitoring is a starting point, not a finish line. At p=none, you get visibility but no protection from spoofing.
- Nobody reading the reports. The reporting address goes to a mailbox that fills up and gets ignored.
- Assuming DMARC stops all phishing. It stops spoofing of your exact domain. It does nothing about look-alike domains such as "softwarepac-billing.com," display-name tricks, or a real account that has been compromised.
That last point matters. Email authentication is one layer. You still need user awareness, MFA on every mailbox, and a plan for when someone clicks. Our post on what to do in the first hour after someone clicks a phishing link is a good companion to this one, and our 10 steps for Roanoke small businesses shows where email security fits in a broader plan.
Frequently asked questions
Do I need SPF, DKIM and DMARC if I only send a few emails a day?
Yes, in our view. The strict bulk-sender rules apply to high-volume senders, but mailbox providers judge all mail partly on authentication. More importantly, DMARC protects your customers and suppliers from criminals sending fake invoices using your domain, no matter how much email you send yourself.
Will setting up DMARC stop our emails from being delivered?
Not if you start at p=none. That setting only collects reports and doesn't change how your mail is handled. Delivery problems happen when a business jumps straight to quarantine or reject before every legitimate sender is passing SPF or DKIM.
What is the difference between SPF, DKIM and DMARC?
SPF lists which servers may send email for your domain. DKIM adds a cryptographic signature that proves a message came from you and wasn't changed. DMARC checks that those results match your visible From address, tells receivers what to do with failures, and sends you reports.
How do I check if my domain already has SPF, DKIM and DMARC?
Free online lookup tools from DMARC and email deliverability vendors will show your current SPF and DMARC records if you type in your domain. You can also open any email you've sent to a Gmail account, choose "Show original," and look for "SPF: PASS," "DKIM: PASS" and "DMARC: PASS." If any of those say FAIL or are missing, you have work to do.
How long does it take to get to p=reject?
For a typical small business, commonly somewhere between one and three months. Most of that is waiting for reports to confirm every legitimate sender is passing. The actual DNS changes take minutes; the inventory and verification take the time.
Get a second set of eyes on your email security
If you read this and thought "I'm not sure who set up our DNS, or what's in it," you're in good company. Most of the small businesses we talk to have never had anyone look at these records end to end.
Email authentication is one of the things we check in our free cybersecurity assessment. We'll look at your SPF, DKIM and DMARC setup along with the rest of your security posture and give you a plain-English list of what to fix first. No pressure and no jargon.
Related reading
- What to Do in the First Hour After Someone Clicks a Phishing Link
- How to Answer Your Cyber Insurance Security Questionnaire
- EDR vs. XDR vs. Antivirus: What Small Businesses Actually Need
Harsha is a co-founder of SoftwarePac Technologies in Roanoke, VA, and a network engineer with 15 years of experience.




